> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.phoneuse.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Subscribe your system to what happens here > Creates a subscription and returns its signing secret ONCE. Store the secret where your receiver can read it: to get another you have to rotate, which stops the old one working. HOW TO VERIFY A DELIVERY. Every request carries `Phonebase-Signature: t=,v1=`, where the hex is HMAC-SHA256 of `.` under your secret. Compute it over the RAW bytes you received, before any JSON parsing, compare in constant time, and reject anything whose `t` is further from your own clock than you are willing to accept. The timestamp is inside the signed material precisely so that a captured delivery cannot be replayed at you a year later. DELIVERY IS AT LEAST ONCE. `Phonebase-Delivery` is the same on every retry of one delivery, so deduplicate on it. A non-2xx answer is retried 5 times in all, over about twenty five minutes, and then given up on. Redirects are NOT followed: a 30x is recorded as the answer it is, because following one would send your payload to a url nobody checked. The destination must be https and must be reachable on the public internet. An address inside a private network is refused because this service would be the one making the request. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api/openapi.json post /v1/webhooks openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Phonebase HTTP API version: 0.1.0 summary: >- Every HTTP operation the control plane mounts, generated from the app's own route table. description: >- The control plane exposes two HTTP surfaces, and reading the boundary between them matters more than reading any single endpoint. The CONTROL surface is what your backend and your operators call. It takes a bearer token in the `Authorization` header, and two credential channels resolve to the same authorization context: an OAuth 2.1 access token for interactive clients, or an org scoped API key for headless ones. The DEVICE surface, under `/vrx/{runToken}/v1`, is what a worker calls while executing one run. Its credential is the run token in the url path, and it reads no `Authorization` header at all. Device control itself is not REST. An agent taps, swipes and reads the screen over the Model Context Protocol at `POST /mcp`, one tool call at a time. There is no `POST /v1/devices/{id}/tap`, and if you are looking for one, start with the tool reference instead. Operations marked `"x-phonebase-modes": ["hosted"]` exist only on a hosted deployment; a local checkout does not mount them. servers: - url: '{origin}' description: Your control plane origin. variables: origin: default: https://mcp.phonebase.co enum: - https://mcp.phonebase.co - http://127.0.0.1:8788 description: >- The hosted deployment serves the public origin its metadata document advertises, and that is the default here. Select the loopback entry instead when you are running a local checkout, which serves the port `PORT` names. security: [] tags: - name: Apps description: Save immutable application builds and manage explicit device operations. - name: Managed Proxy description: >- Organization-owned fixed egress resources, independent one-time orders and verified network relationships. - name: Health description: Liveness, unauthenticated. - name: Gateway enrollment description: >- How a new gateway computer trades a one-time enrollment code for its tunnel credential. Unauthenticated: the code is the credential. - name: Gateway releases description: >- What a gateway computer installs: the current edge release of a channel. Called with the gateway's own credential. - name: MCP description: The JSON-RPC endpoint an agent drives devices through. - name: Copilot description: >- Drive a device by chatting. A signed in person's own conversations, streamed. Hosted deployments only. - name: Discovery description: Where to authenticate. Served on hosted deployments only. - name: Runs description: Start, watch and steer a run. - name: API keys description: Mint and revoke headless credentials. Hosted deployments only. - name: Device surface description: What a worker calls with its run token to observe and act. - name: Usage description: Read your org's own receipts and consumption. Hosted deployments only. - name: Devices description: Read the fleet your credential can see. Hosted deployments only. - name: Notifications description: >- What a person needs to know when they are not watching, and which emails they receive. Hosted deployments only. - name: Webhooks description: >- Subscribe your own system to what happens here, and read what was delivered. Hosted deployments only. - name: Provisioning description: >- Whether an organisation is provisioned, and how it becomes so. Hosted deployments only, and both operations answer a declared 503 on a deployment that cannot provision yet. paths: /v1/webhooks: post: tags: - Webhooks summary: Subscribe your system to what happens here description: >- Creates a subscription and returns its signing secret ONCE. Store the secret where your receiver can read it: to get another you have to rotate, which stops the old one working. HOW TO VERIFY A DELIVERY. Every request carries `Phonebase-Signature: t=,v1=`, where the hex is HMAC-SHA256 of `.` under your secret. Compute it over the RAW bytes you received, before any JSON parsing, compare in constant time, and reject anything whose `t` is further from your own clock than you are willing to accept. The timestamp is inside the signed material precisely so that a captured delivery cannot be replayed at you a year later. DELIVERY IS AT LEAST ONCE. `Phonebase-Delivery` is the same on every retry of one delivery, so deduplicate on it. A non-2xx answer is retried 5 times in all, over about twenty five minutes, and then given up on. Redirects are NOT followed: a 30x is recorded as the answer it is, because following one would send your payload to a url nobody checked. The destination must be https and must be reachable on the public internet. An address inside a private network is refused because this service would be the one making the request. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. operationId: postV1Webhooks requestBody: description: Where to post, and what to post about. required: true content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: url: type: string description: >- An https url, at most 2000 characters, with no credentials in it. maxLength: 2000 events: type: array minItems: 1 items: type: string enum: - run.ended - run.needs_user_control - schedule.triggered - fulfilment.changed description: An event to subscribe to. description: >- At least one event. An unknown name is refused rather than ignored. required: - url - events additionalProperties: false responses: '201': description: >- The subscription, and its signing secret. The only time the secret appears. content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: webhook: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Webhook' secret: type: string description: The signing secret. Returned once. Store it now. required: - webhook - secret additionalProperties: false '400': description: >- The url was not an acceptable destination, an event name was unknown, or your org already holds 20 subscriptions. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '401': description: No credential, or one that was refused. headers: WWW-Authenticate: description: >- A bearer challenge. On a hosted deployment it names the metadata document to discover the authorization server from, and it adds `error="invalid_token"` when a credential was presented and rejected. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/UnauthorizedError' '403': description: >- Authenticated, but this credential does not carry what the call needs. Every authenticated endpoint can also answer `org_not_served_by_instance` here: the organization named by the credential belongs to a different authentication instance, so re-authenticating will not help. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '413': description: >- The request body exceeds the server's limit (1 MiB). Refused before the body is parsed, so nothing was partially applied. Retrying the same body will fail the same way: send less. Per-field limits are tighter than this and are documented on the fields themselves; this is the backstop underneath them. The shape is the same on ordinary JSON surfaces, /vrx included. The explicitly configured APK content stream documents its own byte ceiling. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/PayloadTooLargeError' '429': description: >- Over the request budget for this caller. Hosted deployments only. Which budget applied depends on whether this request carried an `Authorization` header, not on which endpoint it was aimed at. Wait `Retry-After` seconds and retry the same request: the refusal happens before any work, so nothing was partially applied. See /api/rate-limits. headers: Retry-After: description: >- Whole seconds until one request is available again. Computed from the caller's own remaining allowance, not a fixed constant. schema: type: string RateLimit-Limit: description: >- The budget in effect for this caller class, in requests per minute. schema: type: string RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Whole requests that were still available when this request was admitted. Zero on a 429. schema: type: string RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until the allowance is back to full. Longer than `Retry-After`, which is the wait for a single request. schema: type: string RateLimit-Policy: description: The budget and its window, as `;w=60`. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RateLimitedError' '503': description: >- The authentication backend could not be reached. The service fails closed: an infrastructure fault is refused, never waved through. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: Webhook: type: object properties: webhookId: type: string url: type: string description: Where deliveries are posted. events: type: array items: type: string enum: - run.ended - run.needs_user_control - schedule.triggered - fulfilment.changed description: An event this subscription wants. description: What this subscription is subscribed to. enabled: type: boolean description: A disabled subscription receives nothing and is not retried. secretHint: type: string description: >- The signing secret's last four characters, so you can tell which secret you configured. The secret itself is returned only when it is created or rotated. createdAt: type: string format: date-time secretRotatedAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time description: When the secret was last rotated, or null when it is the original. required: - webhookId - url - events - enabled - secretHint - createdAt - secretRotatedAt additionalProperties: false Error: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - backend_resolution_failed - backend_not_implemented - device_unavailable - device_disconnected - lease_mismatch - lease_required - capability_unsupported - invalid_argument - backend_command_failed - idempotency_conflict - action_outcome_unknown - stale_frame - internal_error - unauthorized - permission_denied - run_not_found - frame_not_found - device_busy - admission_unavailable - checkout_unavailable - checkout_customer_balance - checkout_in_progress - quote_changed - payment_in_progress - out_of_stock - wrong_state - instance_not_served - reverification_required - not_found - receipt_not_found - rate_limited - payload_too_large - origin_not_allowed - api_key_from_browser_origin - key_predates_instance_attribution - org_not_served_by_instance - tenant_binding_unavailable - tenant_binding_unsettled - fleet_at_capacity - forbidden - service_unavailable - invalid_signature - invalid_event - not_settled description: >- The closed set of codes this service answers with on purpose, on MCP tools and REST alike (D152). What each one means and when you get it is on the errors page. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. Do not branch on it, branch on `code`. retryable: type: boolean description: >- Whether re-issuing the same call unchanged is meaningful. It is a property of the occurrence, not of the code, so read the field rather than inferring it. required: - code - message additionalProperties: true description: >- Specific errors add their own fields, such as `deviceId`, `reason` or `capability`. Read the ones you branch on and ignore the rest. required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- The control surface error envelope. Every non 2xx JSON body on this surface has this shape. UnauthorizedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: unauthorized description: Always `unauthorized` on this response. reason: type: string enum: - missing_credentials - malformed_credentials - invalid_token - token_expired - wrong_audience - missing_org - missing_org_role - unknown_key - revoked_key - expired_key description: The closed set of ways authentication can fail. hint: type: string description: >- A next step in prose, on the reasons where there is one to give: `revoked_key`, `expired_key`, `missing_org_role`, and `invalid_token` when the account is not a member of the named organization. Absent otherwise, so branch on `reason` and show this if it is there. required: - code - reason additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A refused credential. `unknown_key` covers both a keyId nobody has and a secret that does not match, because telling those apart would enumerate keys for you. Revocation and expiry are distinguishable, since you owned that key. PayloadTooLargeError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: payload_too_large description: Always `payload_too_large` on this response. message: type: string description: A human readable summary naming the limit in bytes. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Returned when the request body exceeds the server limit. Identical on every surface, including /vrx. RateLimitedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: rate_limited description: Always `rate_limited` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary. The numbers are in the headers, not in here. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Over the request budget. Raised by the rate limiter before any handler runs, which is why its code is not one of the action codes: nothing was attempted, so no action failed. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- The control surface credential. Send `Authorization: Bearer `. Two kinds of token are accepted and they are told apart by shape, not by a separate header. A token beginning `pbk_` is an org scoped API key, whose public half and secret half are generated together and of which only a hash of the secret is ever stored; anything else is treated as an OAuth 2.1 access token and verified against the authorization server's keys. Both resolve to the same context: an org, a principal and a set of scopes. Nothing downstream branches on which channel you used, with one deliberate exception, key management, which requires a signed-in person so that a key can never mint another key. Scopes are enforced when MCP tools are REGISTERED rather than when they are called, so a tool your credential cannot use is absent from `tools/list` rather than refused mid gesture. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.