> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.phoneuse.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Read one receipt > One recorded action, addressed by the `idempotencyKey` you sent with it. This is the permanent URL for a receipt: the listing answers what has happened, and this answers what happened in one case, without paging to find it again. THE KEY IS NOT UNIQUE ON ITS OWN. Idempotency is defined per device, so one organisation may hold the same key on two devices. When it does, this answers 400 and asks for `deviceId` rather than choosing a receipt for you: a page showing the wrong action with nothing to say so is worse than a refusal. Keys minted by agent runs carry a frame id and never collide, so this is a hand written key's problem. A key belonging to another organisation answers 404 exactly as one that was never used does, and a key narrowed to a subset of devices reads only within that subset. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api/openapi.json get /v1/receipts/{idempotencyKey} openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Phonebase HTTP API version: 0.1.0 summary: >- Every HTTP operation the control plane mounts, generated from the app's own route table. description: >- The control plane exposes two HTTP surfaces, and reading the boundary between them matters more than reading any single endpoint. The CONTROL surface is what your backend and your operators call. It takes a bearer token in the `Authorization` header, and two credential channels resolve to the same authorization context: an OAuth 2.1 access token for interactive clients, or an org scoped API key for headless ones. The DEVICE surface, under `/vrx/{runToken}/v1`, is what a worker calls while executing one run. Its credential is the run token in the url path, and it reads no `Authorization` header at all. Device control itself is not REST. An agent taps, swipes and reads the screen over the Model Context Protocol at `POST /mcp`, one tool call at a time. There is no `POST /v1/devices/{id}/tap`, and if you are looking for one, start with the tool reference instead. Operations marked `"x-phonebase-modes": ["hosted"]` exist only on a hosted deployment; a local checkout does not mount them. servers: - url: '{origin}' description: Your control plane origin. variables: origin: default: https://mcp.phonebase.co enum: - https://mcp.phonebase.co - http://127.0.0.1:8788 description: >- The hosted deployment serves the public origin its metadata document advertises, and that is the default here. Select the loopback entry instead when you are running a local checkout, which serves the port `PORT` names. security: [] tags: - name: Apps description: Save immutable application builds and manage explicit device operations. - name: Managed Proxy description: >- Organization-owned fixed egress resources, independent one-time orders and verified network relationships. - name: Health description: Liveness, unauthenticated. - name: Gateway enrollment description: >- How a new gateway computer trades a one-time enrollment code for its tunnel credential. Unauthenticated: the code is the credential. - name: Gateway releases description: >- What a gateway computer installs: the current edge release of a channel. Called with the gateway's own credential. - name: MCP description: The JSON-RPC endpoint an agent drives devices through. - name: Copilot description: >- Drive a device by chatting. A signed in person's own conversations, streamed. Hosted deployments only. - name: Discovery description: Where to authenticate. Served on hosted deployments only. - name: Runs description: Start, watch and steer a run. - name: API keys description: Mint and revoke headless credentials. Hosted deployments only. - name: Device surface description: What a worker calls with its run token to observe and act. - name: Usage description: Read your org's own receipts and consumption. Hosted deployments only. - name: Devices description: Read the fleet your credential can see. Hosted deployments only. - name: Notifications description: >- What a person needs to know when they are not watching, and which emails they receive. Hosted deployments only. - name: Webhooks description: >- Subscribe your own system to what happens here, and read what was delivered. Hosted deployments only. - name: Provisioning description: >- Whether an organisation is provisioned, and how it becomes so. Hosted deployments only, and both operations answer a declared 503 on a deployment that cannot provision yet. paths: /v1/receipts/{idempotencyKey}: get: tags: - Usage summary: Read one receipt description: >- One recorded action, addressed by the `idempotencyKey` you sent with it. This is the permanent URL for a receipt: the listing answers what has happened, and this answers what happened in one case, without paging to find it again. THE KEY IS NOT UNIQUE ON ITS OWN. Idempotency is defined per device, so one organisation may hold the same key on two devices. When it does, this answers 400 and asks for `deviceId` rather than choosing a receipt for you: a page showing the wrong action with nothing to say so is worse than a refusal. Keys minted by agent runs carry a frame id and never collide, so this is a hand written key's problem. A key belonging to another organisation answers 404 exactly as one that was never used does, and a key narrowed to a subset of devices reads only within that subset. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. operationId: getV1ReceiptsByIdempotencyKey parameters: - name: idempotencyKey in: path required: true description: >- The key you sent with the action, percent encoded. 1 to 128 printable ASCII characters. schema: type: string - name: deviceId in: query required: false description: >- Which device's receipt, when the same key was used on more than one. Omit it unless the response asks for it. schema: type: string responses: '200': description: The receipt. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Receipt' '400': description: >- An unusable key or `deviceId`, or a key used on more than one device and no `deviceId` to pick between them. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '401': description: No credential, or one that was refused. headers: WWW-Authenticate: description: >- A bearer challenge. On a hosted deployment it names the metadata document to discover the authorization server from, and it adds `error="invalid_token"` when a credential was presented and rejected. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/UnauthorizedError' '403': description: Reading receipts needs `devices:read`. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '404': description: No receipt with that key that you may read. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ReceiptNotFoundError' '429': description: >- Over the request budget for this caller. Hosted deployments only. Which budget applied depends on whether this request carried an `Authorization` header, not on which endpoint it was aimed at. Wait `Retry-After` seconds and retry the same request: the refusal happens before any work, so nothing was partially applied. See /api/rate-limits. headers: Retry-After: description: >- Whole seconds until one request is available again. Computed from the caller's own remaining allowance, not a fixed constant. schema: type: string RateLimit-Limit: description: >- The budget in effect for this caller class, in requests per minute. schema: type: string RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Whole requests that were still available when this request was admitted. Zero on a 429. schema: type: string RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until the allowance is back to full. Longer than `Retry-After`, which is the wait for a single request. schema: type: string RateLimit-Policy: description: The budget and its window, as `;w=60`. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RateLimitedError' '503': description: >- The authentication backend could not be reached. The service fails closed: an infrastructure fault is refused, never waved through. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: Receipt: type: object properties: orgId: type: string deviceId: type: string idempotencyKey: type: string description: The key the caller supplied, which is what makes a retry a replay. backendKind: type: string action: type: string description: Which action was attempted. argsSummary: type: object additionalProperties: true description: >- A summary of the arguments, not the raw input. Text is bounded and never echoed wholesale. status: type: string enum: - pending - committed - failed description: Where this action ended up. requestedAt: type: string format: date-time committedAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time failedAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time observedFrame: type: string description: The frame this action was bound to, when it was bound to one. error: type: object additionalProperties: true description: Present on a failed receipt. reason: type: string description: >- Why a failure was recorded, where the failure had a classified cause. requiresManualReview: type: boolean description: >- The physical outcome is unknown (a crash or a lost transport) and needs reconciliation. actor: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Actor' principalKind: type: string enum: - api_key - oauth - dev_token - system - unattributed description: >- SUPERSEDED by `actor.kind`, and identical to it. Read `actor` in new code; this stays because a consumer already reads it. apiKeyId: type: string description: >- SUPERSEDED by `actor.apiKeyId`, and identical to it. Read `actor` in new code. reviewedAt: type: string format: date-time description: >- When a person opened this receipt. Absent until one does, and fixed once set: the first instant is the answer to how long it waited. It records that somebody LOOKED, and not that the action was correct or accepted. reviewedBy: type: string description: >- Who looked. A subject id, never a name, and set together with `reviewedAt` or not at all. required: - orgId - deviceId - idempotencyKey - backendKind - action - argsSummary - status - requestedAt - actor - principalKind additionalProperties: false description: >- One recorded action, and who took it. `actor` names a person or a key by id, so a receipt can be attributed to the particular credential that made the call. THE LEASE THE ACTION RAN UNDER IS NOT PART OF THIS SHAPE. A receipt used to carry `leaseId` and `fencingToken`, and both are gone as of 2026-09-12. They are credentials: a lease id is what releases a lease and a fencing token is what orders writes under it, which is why the `get_receipt` tool already withheld both and why `GET /v1/leases` names no lease id either. Reading receipts needs only `devices:read`, so publishing them here let a read-only credential lift a live lease off the newest receipt and hand it to one that can act. Nothing replaces them on this face. `principalKind` and `apiKeyId` beside it say the same thing in a flatter shape. They are not new: this endpoint has returned them since attribution was added, without declaring them here, and declaring them is part of the same change that added `actor`. New code should read `actor`, which is the only one of the two that can name a person. Error: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - backend_resolution_failed - backend_not_implemented - device_unavailable - device_disconnected - lease_mismatch - lease_required - capability_unsupported - invalid_argument - backend_command_failed - idempotency_conflict - action_outcome_unknown - stale_frame - internal_error - unauthorized - permission_denied - run_not_found - frame_not_found - device_busy - admission_unavailable - checkout_unavailable - checkout_customer_balance - checkout_in_progress - quote_changed - payment_in_progress - out_of_stock - wrong_state - instance_not_served - reverification_required - not_found - receipt_not_found - rate_limited - payload_too_large - origin_not_allowed - api_key_from_browser_origin - key_predates_instance_attribution - org_not_served_by_instance - tenant_binding_unavailable - tenant_binding_unsettled - fleet_at_capacity - forbidden - service_unavailable - invalid_signature - invalid_event - not_settled description: >- The closed set of codes this service answers with on purpose, on MCP tools and REST alike (D152). What each one means and when you get it is on the errors page. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. Do not branch on it, branch on `code`. retryable: type: boolean description: >- Whether re-issuing the same call unchanged is meaningful. It is a property of the occurrence, not of the code, so read the field rather than inferring it. required: - code - message additionalProperties: true description: >- Specific errors add their own fields, such as `deviceId`, `reason` or `capability`. Read the ones you branch on and ignore the rest. required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- The control surface error envelope. Every non 2xx JSON body on this surface has this shape. UnauthorizedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: unauthorized description: Always `unauthorized` on this response. reason: type: string enum: - missing_credentials - malformed_credentials - invalid_token - token_expired - wrong_audience - missing_org - missing_org_role - unknown_key - revoked_key - expired_key description: The closed set of ways authentication can fail. hint: type: string description: >- A next step in prose, on the reasons where there is one to give: `revoked_key`, `expired_key`, `missing_org_role`, and `invalid_token` when the account is not a member of the named organization. Absent otherwise, so branch on `reason` and show this if it is there. required: - code - reason additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A refused credential. `unknown_key` covers both a keyId nobody has and a secret that does not match, because telling those apart would enumerate keys for you. Revocation and expiry are distinguishable, since you owned that key. ReceiptNotFoundError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: receipt_not_found description: Always `receipt_not_found` on this response. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- No receipt with that key that you may read. A key another organisation holds answers exactly as one nobody holds, so this is not an existence oracle over other tenants' keys. RateLimitedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: rate_limited description: Always `rate_limited` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary. The numbers are in the headers, not in here. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Over the request budget. Raised by the rate limiter before any handler runs, which is why its code is not one of the action codes: nothing was attempted, so no action failed. Actor: type: object properties: kind: type: string enum: - api_key - oauth - dev_token - system - unattributed description: >- Which credential this was. `system` is phonebase itself: a schedule's timer, or phonebase driving a run, and `onBehalfOf` then says for whom; it is never a person. `unattributed` means the record cannot say, which is NOT the same as a positive claim that no key was involved: it is what a row written before this field existed reads as. userId: type: string description: >- The authorization server's subject id of the PERSON, present only when `kind` is `oauth`. It is an id and never a name: resolve it through your own directory. Nothing here stores a name or an email address. apiKeyId: type: string description: >- The key's id, present only when `kind` is `api_key`. The same id `GET /v1/api-keys` lists. viaCopilot: type: boolean description: >- Whether a copilot did this on the named person's behalf. The person stays responsible: a label reads like "Mira Osei via copilot". ALWAYS PRESENT, and false today on every record, because there is no copilot yet. Present and false says so; an absent field would only mean an older server. onBehalfOf: type: object properties: kind: type: string enum: - schedule - user - api_key - dev_token description: >- Whose work it was: `schedule` (a timer fired), `user` or `api_key` (phonebase drove a run that person or key started), or `dev_token` (the local operator). scheduleId: type: string description: The schedule, when `kind` is `schedule`. userId: type: string description: >- The person's subject id, when `kind` is `user`. An id, never a name. apiKeyId: type: string description: The key's id, when `kind` is `api_key`. required: - kind additionalProperties: false description: >- Present exactly when `kind` is `system`: the control plane acted, and this says for whom. Never present on any other kind. required: - kind - viaCopilot additionalProperties: false description: >- WHO. The same shape answers three questions: who took an action (`Receipt.actor`), who is holding a device (`Lease.holder`), and who started a run (`RunView.initiator`). One shape on purpose, so the three can never disagree about what a given credential is called. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- The control surface credential. Send `Authorization: Bearer `. Two kinds of token are accepted and they are told apart by shape, not by a separate header. A token beginning `pbk_` is an org scoped API key, whose public half and secret half are generated together and of which only a hash of the secret is ever stored; anything else is treated as an OAuth 2.1 access token and verified against the authorization server's keys. Both resolve to the same context: an org, a principal and a set of scopes. Nothing downstream branches on which channel you used, with one deliberate exception, key management, which requires a signed-in person so that a key can never mint another key. Scopes are enforced when MCP tools are REGISTERED rather than when they are called, so a tool your credential cannot use is absent from `tools/list` rather than refused mid gesture. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.