> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.phoneuse.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Cancel an order that has not arrived, and get all of it back > Ends an order that is still `awaiting_provisioning` and refunds the whole payment. CANCEL OR RETURN, and the difference is whether anything was ever delivered. An order still awaiting provisioning is one where the shelf was empty when it settled: nothing arrived, so all of the money goes back and this is the route. An order that IS provisioned has been in your hands, and `POST /v1/fulfilments/{id}/return` is the route for that. Calling the wrong one answers 409 naming the state the order is actually in, rather than quietly doing the other thing. PRESSING IT TWICE IS SAFE AND IS NOT AN ERROR, and you do not have to do anything to make it so: the key is derived from the order and the action, so every retry of one cancellation lands on the same one whether or not you send anything. Send no `Idempotency-Key` here; this route does not read one. A REPEAT WITHIN 24 HOURS IS ANSWERED WITH THE FIRST ATTEMPT'S ANSWER, unchanged, and carries `Idempotent-Replayed: true`. After that the order is simply found already ended and answers 200 with `alreadyDone: true`. Either way the payment provider is asked for nothing, so a double-clicked button cannot produce a second refund. Two calls that arrive AT THE SAME TIME do not both proceed: one does the work and the other is told so with 409 `idempotency_conflict` and `retryable: true`. ADMIN, AND A SIGNED-IN PRINCIPAL ONLY, the same rule the purchase has and for the reason turned around: if only an admin can commit the organisation to a subscription, only an admin can end one. An API key is refused, because undoing a purchase is not something a program should do while nobody is watching. NOTHING IS RECORDED UNTIL THE PROVIDER HAS AGREED. If the refund cannot be arranged, the order is left exactly as it was and you are told to try again. An order marked cancelled with the money still taken would look like success from every screen, which is why the order of operations is this way round. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api/openapi.json post /v1/fulfilments/{id}/cancel openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Phonebase HTTP API version: 0.1.0 summary: >- Every HTTP operation the control plane mounts, generated from the app's own route table. description: >- The control plane exposes two HTTP surfaces, and reading the boundary between them matters more than reading any single endpoint. The CONTROL surface is what your backend and your operators call. It takes a bearer token in the `Authorization` header, and two credential channels resolve to the same authorization context: an OAuth 2.1 access token for interactive clients, or an org scoped API key for headless ones. The DEVICE surface, under `/vrx/{runToken}/v1`, is what a worker calls while executing one run. Its credential is the run token in the url path, and it reads no `Authorization` header at all. Device control itself is not REST. An agent taps, swipes and reads the screen over the Model Context Protocol at `POST /mcp`, one tool call at a time. There is no `POST /v1/devices/{id}/tap`, and if you are looking for one, start with the tool reference instead. Operations marked `"x-phonebase-modes": ["hosted"]` exist only on a hosted deployment; a local checkout does not mount them. servers: - url: '{origin}' description: Your control plane origin. variables: origin: default: https://mcp.phonebase.co enum: - https://mcp.phonebase.co - http://127.0.0.1:8788 description: >- The hosted deployment serves the public origin its metadata document advertises, and that is the default here. Select the loopback entry instead when you are running a local checkout, which serves the port `PORT` names. security: [] tags: - name: Apps description: Save immutable application builds and manage explicit device operations. - name: Managed Proxy description: >- Organization-owned fixed egress resources, independent one-time orders and verified network relationships. - name: Health description: Liveness, unauthenticated. - name: Gateway enrollment description: >- How a new gateway computer trades a one-time enrollment code for its tunnel credential. Unauthenticated: the code is the credential. - name: Gateway releases description: >- What a gateway computer installs: the current edge release of a channel. Called with the gateway's own credential. - name: MCP description: The JSON-RPC endpoint an agent drives devices through. - name: Copilot description: >- Drive a device by chatting. A signed in person's own conversations, streamed. Hosted deployments only. - name: Discovery description: Where to authenticate. Served on hosted deployments only. - name: Runs description: Start, watch and steer a run. - name: API keys description: Mint and revoke headless credentials. Hosted deployments only. - name: Device surface description: What a worker calls with its run token to observe and act. - name: Usage description: Read your org's own receipts and consumption. Hosted deployments only. - name: Devices description: Read the fleet your credential can see. Hosted deployments only. - name: Notifications description: >- What a person needs to know when they are not watching, and which emails they receive. Hosted deployments only. - name: Webhooks description: >- Subscribe your own system to what happens here, and read what was delivered. Hosted deployments only. - name: Provisioning description: >- Whether an organisation is provisioned, and how it becomes so. Hosted deployments only, and both operations answer a declared 503 on a deployment that cannot provision yet. paths: /v1/fulfilments/{id}/cancel: post: tags: - Provisioning summary: Cancel an order that has not arrived, and get all of it back description: >- Ends an order that is still `awaiting_provisioning` and refunds the whole payment. CANCEL OR RETURN, and the difference is whether anything was ever delivered. An order still awaiting provisioning is one where the shelf was empty when it settled: nothing arrived, so all of the money goes back and this is the route. An order that IS provisioned has been in your hands, and `POST /v1/fulfilments/{id}/return` is the route for that. Calling the wrong one answers 409 naming the state the order is actually in, rather than quietly doing the other thing. PRESSING IT TWICE IS SAFE AND IS NOT AN ERROR, and you do not have to do anything to make it so: the key is derived from the order and the action, so every retry of one cancellation lands on the same one whether or not you send anything. Send no `Idempotency-Key` here; this route does not read one. A REPEAT WITHIN 24 HOURS IS ANSWERED WITH THE FIRST ATTEMPT'S ANSWER, unchanged, and carries `Idempotent-Replayed: true`. After that the order is simply found already ended and answers 200 with `alreadyDone: true`. Either way the payment provider is asked for nothing, so a double-clicked button cannot produce a second refund. Two calls that arrive AT THE SAME TIME do not both proceed: one does the work and the other is told so with 409 `idempotency_conflict` and `retryable: true`. ADMIN, AND A SIGNED-IN PRINCIPAL ONLY, the same rule the purchase has and for the reason turned around: if only an admin can commit the organisation to a subscription, only an admin can end one. An API key is refused, because undoing a purchase is not something a program should do while nobody is watching. NOTHING IS RECORDED UNTIL THE PROVIDER HAS AGREED. If the refund cannot be arranged, the order is left exactly as it was and you are told to try again. An order marked cancelled with the money still taken would look like success from every screen, which is why the order of operations is this way round. Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. operationId: postV1FulfilmentsByIdCancel parameters: - name: id in: path required: true description: The order id, as `GET /v1/fulfilments` reports it. schema: type: string responses: '200': description: The order is ended. headers: Idempotent-Replayed: description: >- `true` when this answer was recorded by an earlier attempt and handed back unchanged rather than produced now. Absent otherwise. schema: type: string enum: - 'true' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/OrderChanged' '400': description: The id in the path is not one this service could have stored. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '401': description: No credential, or one that was refused. headers: WWW-Authenticate: description: >- A bearer challenge. On a hosted deployment it names the metadata document to discover the authorization server from, and it adds `error="invalid_token"` when a credential was presented and rejected. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/UnauthorizedError' '403': description: >- Only a signed-in org admin can change an order; an API key is refused by design. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '404': description: No such order of yours. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/NotFoundError' '409': description: >- `wrong_state`: this order is not awaiting provisioning. The body names the state it IS in, so a client can offer the right action instead. A provisioned order is returned, not cancelled. `idempotency_conflict` with `retryable: true`: another attempt at this same cancellation is running right now. Nothing is wrong; send the same request again in a moment. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '413': description: >- The request body exceeds the server's limit (1 MiB). Refused before the body is parsed, so nothing was partially applied. Retrying the same body will fail the same way: send less. Per-field limits are tighter than this and are documented on the fields themselves; this is the backstop underneath them. The shape is the same on ordinary JSON surfaces, /vrx included. The explicitly configured APK content stream documents its own byte ceiling. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/PayloadTooLargeError' '429': description: >- Over the request budget for this caller. Hosted deployments only. Which budget applied depends on whether this request carried an `Authorization` header, not on which endpoint it was aimed at. Wait `Retry-After` seconds and retry the same request: the refusal happens before any work, so nothing was partially applied. See /api/rate-limits. headers: Retry-After: description: >- Whole seconds until one request is available again. Computed from the caller's own remaining allowance, not a fixed constant. schema: type: string RateLimit-Limit: description: >- The budget in effect for this caller class, in requests per minute. schema: type: string RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Whole requests that were still available when this request was admitted. Zero on a 429. schema: type: string RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until the allowance is back to full. Longer than `Retry-After`, which is the wait for a single request. schema: type: string RateLimit-Policy: description: The budget and its window, as `;w=60`. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RateLimitedError' '503': description: >- The refund could not be arranged: no payment provider configured here, the provider did not answer, or this order has no settled payment behind it for a person to work from. Nothing was changed. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ProvisioningUnavailableError' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: OrderChanged: type: object properties: id: type: string description: The order this answers about. state: type: string enum: - cancelled description: >- What the order is now. Always `cancelled`: both of these routes end an order. alreadyDone: type: boolean description: >- TRUE when the order had already been ended before this call, so nothing was asked of the payment provider and no second refund was issued. Both cases answer 200. Pressing the button twice is not an error and must not read like one, and this is how a client tells them apart. deviceId: type: - string - 'null' description: >- The device that went back, on a return. Null on a cancellation, where no device had been provided, and null on a repeated call. leaseCut: type: boolean description: >- Whether a session that was live at that moment was ended by this. False for the ordinary return of an idle device, and false on any deployment configured to let sessions expire on their own. required: - id - state - alreadyDone additionalProperties: false description: What ending an order did. Error: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - backend_resolution_failed - backend_not_implemented - device_unavailable - device_disconnected - lease_mismatch - lease_required - capability_unsupported - invalid_argument - backend_command_failed - idempotency_conflict - action_outcome_unknown - stale_frame - internal_error - unauthorized - permission_denied - run_not_found - frame_not_found - device_busy - admission_unavailable - checkout_unavailable - checkout_customer_balance - checkout_in_progress - quote_changed - payment_in_progress - out_of_stock - wrong_state - instance_not_served - reverification_required - not_found - receipt_not_found - rate_limited - payload_too_large - origin_not_allowed - api_key_from_browser_origin - key_predates_instance_attribution - org_not_served_by_instance - tenant_binding_unavailable - tenant_binding_unsettled - fleet_at_capacity - forbidden - service_unavailable - invalid_signature - invalid_event - not_settled description: >- The closed set of codes this service answers with on purpose, on MCP tools and REST alike (D152). What each one means and when you get it is on the errors page. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. Do not branch on it, branch on `code`. retryable: type: boolean description: >- Whether re-issuing the same call unchanged is meaningful. It is a property of the occurrence, not of the code, so read the field rather than inferring it. required: - code - message additionalProperties: true description: >- Specific errors add their own fields, such as `deviceId`, `reason` or `capability`. Read the ones you branch on and ignore the rest. required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- The control surface error envelope. Every non 2xx JSON body on this surface has this shape. UnauthorizedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: unauthorized description: Always `unauthorized` on this response. reason: type: string enum: - missing_credentials - malformed_credentials - invalid_token - token_expired - wrong_audience - missing_org - missing_org_role - unknown_key - revoked_key - expired_key description: The closed set of ways authentication can fail. hint: type: string description: >- A next step in prose, on the reasons where there is one to give: `revoked_key`, `expired_key`, `missing_org_role`, and `invalid_token` when the account is not a member of the named organization. Absent otherwise, so branch on `reason` and show this if it is there. required: - code - reason additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A refused credential. `unknown_key` covers both a keyId nobody has and a secret that does not match, because telling those apart would enumerate keys for you. Revocation and expiry are distinguishable, since you owned that key. NotFoundError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: not_found description: Always `not_found` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary naming the kind of thing that was not found. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- No such thing that you may act on. Not an existence oracle over other organisations' ids. PayloadTooLargeError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: payload_too_large description: Always `payload_too_large` on this response. message: type: string description: A human readable summary naming the limit in bytes. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Returned when the request body exceeds the server limit. Identical on every surface, including /vrx. RateLimitedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: rate_limited description: Always `rate_limited` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary. The numbers are in the headers, not in here. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Over the request budget. Raised by the rate limiter before any handler runs, which is why its code is not one of the action codes: nothing was attempted, so no action failed. ProvisioningUnavailableError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - admission_unavailable - checkout_unavailable description: >- `admission_unavailable`: the provisioning store cannot be read right now; retry after `Retry-After`. `checkout_unavailable`: this deployment is not configured for what was asked. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. Do not branch on it, branch on `code`. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: Provisioning cannot answer on this deployment right now. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- The control surface credential. Send `Authorization: Bearer `. Two kinds of token are accepted and they are told apart by shape, not by a separate header. A token beginning `pbk_` is an org scoped API key, whose public half and secret half are generated together and of which only a hash of the secret is ever stored; anything else is treated as an OAuth 2.1 access token and verified against the authorization server's keys. Both resolve to the same context: an org, a principal and a set of scopes. Nothing downstream branches on which channel you used, with one deliberate exception, key management, which requires a signed-in person so that a key can never mint another key. Scopes are enforced when MCP tools are REGISTERED rather than when they are called, so a tool your credential cannot use is absent from `tools/list` rather than refused mid gesture. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.