> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.phoneuse.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Report the run's outcome > How a worker says it is done. It lives on this surface rather than on the run surface because a worker holds exactly one credential, its run token, and should never need an org credential to close its own work. The token also pins WHICH run is being reported, so a worker cannot close somebody else's. `needs_user_control` parks the run for a person, who lifts it through the run surface. Secrets never travel in this body. Once a run is parked, only a person can end it: a `succeeded` or `failed` report on a parked run is refused with a 409 until someone resumes or cancels it. Reporting `needs_user_control` again is allowed and only refreshes the handoff instruction. This operation reads no `Authorization` header. The run token in the path IS the credential, so the whole url is secret: never log it, paste it, or commit it. Every example writes `{runToken}` for that reason. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api/openapi.json post /vrx/{runToken}/v1/report openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Phonebase HTTP API version: 0.1.0 summary: >- Every HTTP operation the control plane mounts, generated from the app's own route table. description: >- The control plane exposes two HTTP surfaces, and reading the boundary between them matters more than reading any single endpoint. The CONTROL surface is what your backend and your operators call. It takes a bearer token in the `Authorization` header, and two credential channels resolve to the same authorization context: an OAuth 2.1 access token for interactive clients, or an org scoped API key for headless ones. The DEVICE surface, under `/vrx/{runToken}/v1`, is what a worker calls while executing one run. Its credential is the run token in the url path, and it reads no `Authorization` header at all. Device control itself is not REST. An agent taps, swipes and reads the screen over the Model Context Protocol at `POST /mcp`, one tool call at a time. There is no `POST /v1/devices/{id}/tap`, and if you are looking for one, start with the tool reference instead. Operations marked `"x-phonebase-modes": ["hosted"]` exist only on a hosted deployment; a local checkout does not mount them. servers: - url: '{origin}' description: Your control plane origin. variables: origin: default: https://mcp.phonebase.co enum: - https://mcp.phonebase.co - http://127.0.0.1:8788 description: >- The hosted deployment serves the public origin its metadata document advertises, and that is the default here. Select the loopback entry instead when you are running a local checkout, which serves the port `PORT` names. security: [] tags: - name: Apps description: Save immutable application builds and manage explicit device operations. - name: Managed Proxy description: >- Organization-owned fixed egress resources, independent one-time orders and verified network relationships. - name: Health description: Liveness, unauthenticated. - name: Gateway enrollment description: >- How a new gateway computer trades a one-time enrollment code for its tunnel credential. Unauthenticated: the code is the credential. - name: Gateway releases description: >- What a gateway computer installs: the current edge release of a channel. Called with the gateway's own credential. - name: MCP description: The JSON-RPC endpoint an agent drives devices through. - name: Copilot description: >- Drive a device by chatting. A signed in person's own conversations, streamed. Hosted deployments only. - name: Discovery description: Where to authenticate. Served on hosted deployments only. - name: Runs description: Start, watch and steer a run. - name: API keys description: Mint and revoke headless credentials. Hosted deployments only. - name: Device surface description: What a worker calls with its run token to observe and act. - name: Usage description: Read your org's own receipts and consumption. Hosted deployments only. - name: Devices description: Read the fleet your credential can see. Hosted deployments only. - name: Notifications description: >- What a person needs to know when they are not watching, and which emails they receive. Hosted deployments only. - name: Webhooks description: >- Subscribe your own system to what happens here, and read what was delivered. Hosted deployments only. - name: Provisioning description: >- Whether an organisation is provisioned, and how it becomes so. Hosted deployments only, and both operations answer a declared 503 on a deployment that cannot provision yet. paths: /vrx/{runToken}/v1/report: post: tags: - Device surface summary: Report the run's outcome description: >- How a worker says it is done. It lives on this surface rather than on the run surface because a worker holds exactly one credential, its run token, and should never need an org credential to close its own work. The token also pins WHICH run is being reported, so a worker cannot close somebody else's. `needs_user_control` parks the run for a person, who lifts it through the run surface. Secrets never travel in this body. Once a run is parked, only a person can end it: a `succeeded` or `failed` report on a parked run is refused with a 409 until someone resumes or cancels it. Reporting `needs_user_control` again is allowed and only refreshes the handoff instruction. This operation reads no `Authorization` header. The run token in the path IS the credential, so the whole url is secret: never log it, paste it, or commit it. Every example writes `{runToken}` for that reason. operationId: postVrxByRunTokenV1Report parameters: - name: runToken in: path required: true description: The run token. Write `{runToken}`; never write a real one down. schema: type: string requestBody: description: The outcome, and optionally what happened. required: true content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: state: type: string enum: - succeeded - failed - needs_user_control description: The outcome being reported. detail: type: string description: >- Free text. No VALUE of this field is refused: long values are truncated at 4000 characters (on a character boundary, so an emoji is not split), a NUL (U+0000) is replaced with U+FFFD because it cannot be stored, and every other character is recorded verbatim. A report is a run reaching its terminal state, so a refusal here would strand the run. The one limit that still applies is the request-wide 1 MiB body cap, which is a transport limit and answers 413 before this field is read: keep the whole request under it, or the run does not terminate. required: - state additionalProperties: false responses: '200': description: The report was recorded. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Ok' '400': description: >- The body is not JSON, or `state` is not one of the reportable states. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/DeviceError' '404': description: >- Unknown, expired, terminal, or addressed at a device this run does not own. All four answer identically, so holding a token tells you nothing about which it was. If you reached this with an org API key rather than a run token, the code is misleading and the message says so: nothing is missing, this is the worker channel and your credential does not apply to it. Drive devices yourself over the MCP endpoint instead. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/DeviceError' '409': description: >- The run is parked for a person: a worker cannot end its own handoff, so only resume or cancel lifts it. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/DeviceError' '413': description: >- The request body exceeds the server's limit (1 MiB). Refused before the body is parsed, so nothing was partially applied. Retrying the same body will fail the same way: send less. Per-field limits are tighter than this and are documented on the fields themselves; this is the backstop underneath them. The shape is the same on ordinary JSON surfaces, /vrx included. The explicitly configured APK content stream documents its own byte ceiling. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/PayloadTooLargeError' '429': description: >- Over the request budget for this caller. Hosted deployments only. Which budget applied depends on whether this request carried an `Authorization` header, not on which endpoint it was aimed at. Wait `Retry-After` seconds and retry the same request: the refusal happens before any work, so nothing was partially applied. See /api/rate-limits. headers: Retry-After: description: >- Whole seconds until one request is available again. Computed from the caller's own remaining allowance, not a fixed constant. schema: type: string RateLimit-Limit: description: >- The budget in effect for this caller class, in requests per minute. schema: type: string RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Whole requests that were still available when this request was admitted. Zero on a 429. schema: type: string RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until the allowance is back to full. Longer than `Retry-After`, which is the wait for a single request. schema: type: string RateLimit-Policy: description: The budget and its window, as `;w=60`. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RateLimitedError' security: [] components: schemas: Ok: type: object properties: ok: type: boolean required: - ok additionalProperties: false DeviceError: type: object properties: ok: type: boolean const: false error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - DEVICE_NOT_FOUND - INVALID_ACTION - FRAME_VIEWPORT_MISMATCH - COORDINATE_OUT_OF_REACH - ACTION_UNAVAILABLE - FENCING_TOKEN_STALE - STALE_FRAME - HARDWARE_OFFLINE - FRAME_UNAVAILABLE - ACTION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN description: The dialect code to branch on. message: type: string description: >- A constant summary per branch. Internal error text is never forwarded here. details: type: object description: >- Structured detail for the branches that have any (spec §8, §15.4). `STALE_FRAME` carries `reason` (`unknown_frame`, `superseded`, `expired`, `viewport_changed`, `others_acted`; read anything else as `unknown_frame`), and an `ACTION_UNAVAILABLE` raised by a full device queue carries `retryAfterMs`. Absent on every other branch, and it never carries internal text. additionalProperties: true required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - ok - error additionalProperties: false description: >- The device surface answers in the dialect's own error shape, not the control surface envelope. PayloadTooLargeError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: payload_too_large description: Always `payload_too_large` on this response. message: type: string description: A human readable summary naming the limit in bytes. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Returned when the request body exceeds the server limit. Identical on every surface, including /vrx. RateLimitedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: rate_limited description: Always `rate_limited` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary. The numbers are in the headers, not in here. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Over the request budget. Raised by the rate limiter before any handler runs, which is why its code is not one of the action codes: nothing was attempted, so no action failed. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.