> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.phoneuse.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Mint an API key > Creates a headless credential for your org. ANY signed-in member of the org can mint one, whatever their role: this is the product's only headless credential, and the first step of getting started asks for it. An API key cannot mint another key, so a leaked key cannot widen its own reach. That is a rule about the CREDENTIAL and not about the person holding it, and no role change reaches it. A KEY NEVER CARRIES MORE SCOPE THAN YOUR OWN SESSION. Asking for one you do not hold is refused 403, not 400: the request is well formed and you are not allowed to make it. Every signed-in member holds the four device and run scopes; only an admin also holds `orders:place`, so a member asking for it is refused. The key records who created it, and that is what decides who may rotate, narrow or revoke it later: you can manage the keys you created, and an admin can manage any of them. `deviceIds` narrows the key to a subset of your org's devices, and every id must already belong to your org. Narrowing applies to visibility as well as addressing, so a device outside the subset is simply not there as far as that key is concerned. Without `ttlMs` the key lasts 90 days (7776000000 ms). Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api/openapi.json post /v1/api-keys openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Phonebase HTTP API version: 0.1.0 summary: >- Every HTTP operation the control plane mounts, generated from the app's own route table. description: >- The control plane exposes two HTTP surfaces, and reading the boundary between them matters more than reading any single endpoint. The CONTROL surface is what your backend and your operators call. It takes a bearer token in the `Authorization` header, and two credential channels resolve to the same authorization context: an OAuth 2.1 access token for interactive clients, or an org scoped API key for headless ones. The DEVICE surface, under `/vrx/{runToken}/v1`, is what a worker calls while executing one run. Its credential is the run token in the url path, and it reads no `Authorization` header at all. Device control itself is not REST. An agent taps, swipes and reads the screen over the Model Context Protocol at `POST /mcp`, one tool call at a time. There is no `POST /v1/devices/{id}/tap`, and if you are looking for one, start with the tool reference instead. Operations marked `"x-phonebase-modes": ["hosted"]` exist only on a hosted deployment; a local checkout does not mount them. servers: - url: '{origin}' description: Your control plane origin. variables: origin: default: https://mcp.phonebase.co enum: - https://mcp.phonebase.co - http://127.0.0.1:8788 description: >- The hosted deployment serves the public origin its metadata document advertises, and that is the default here. Select the loopback entry instead when you are running a local checkout, which serves the port `PORT` names. security: [] tags: - name: Apps description: Save immutable application builds and manage explicit device operations. - name: Managed Proxy description: >- Organization-owned fixed egress resources, independent one-time orders and verified network relationships. - name: Health description: Liveness, unauthenticated. - name: Gateway enrollment description: >- How a new gateway computer trades a one-time enrollment code for its tunnel credential. Unauthenticated: the code is the credential. - name: Gateway releases description: >- What a gateway computer installs: the current edge release of a channel. Called with the gateway's own credential. - name: MCP description: The JSON-RPC endpoint an agent drives devices through. - name: Copilot description: >- Drive a device by chatting. A signed in person's own conversations, streamed. Hosted deployments only. - name: Discovery description: Where to authenticate. Served on hosted deployments only. - name: Runs description: Start, watch and steer a run. - name: API keys description: Mint and revoke headless credentials. Hosted deployments only. - name: Device surface description: What a worker calls with its run token to observe and act. - name: Usage description: Read your org's own receipts and consumption. Hosted deployments only. - name: Devices description: Read the fleet your credential can see. Hosted deployments only. - name: Notifications description: >- What a person needs to know when they are not watching, and which emails they receive. Hosted deployments only. - name: Webhooks description: >- Subscribe your own system to what happens here, and read what was delivered. Hosted deployments only. - name: Provisioning description: >- Whether an organisation is provisioned, and how it becomes so. Hosted deployments only, and both operations answer a declared 503 on a deployment that cannot provision yet. paths: /v1/api-keys: post: tags: - API keys summary: Mint an API key description: >- Creates a headless credential for your org. ANY signed-in member of the org can mint one, whatever their role: this is the product's only headless credential, and the first step of getting started asks for it. An API key cannot mint another key, so a leaked key cannot widen its own reach. That is a rule about the CREDENTIAL and not about the person holding it, and no role change reaches it. A KEY NEVER CARRIES MORE SCOPE THAN YOUR OWN SESSION. Asking for one you do not hold is refused 403, not 400: the request is well formed and you are not allowed to make it. Every signed-in member holds the four device and run scopes; only an admin also holds `orders:place`, so a member asking for it is refused. The key records who created it, and that is what decides who may rotate, narrow or revoke it later: you can manage the keys you created, and an admin can manage any of them. `deviceIds` narrows the key to a subset of your org's devices, and every id must already belong to your org. Narrowing applies to visibility as well as addressing, so a device outside the subset is simply not there as far as that key is concerned. Without `ttlMs` the key lasts 90 days (7776000000 ms). Hosted deployments only. A local checkout does not mount this route, so calling it there is a 404. operationId: postV1ApiKeys requestBody: description: >- The key's name, its scopes, and optionally a device subset and a lifetime. required: true content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: name: type: string description: A label you will recognize later. minLength: 1 maxLength: 120 scopes: type: array minItems: 1 items: type: string enum: - devices:read - devices:act - devices:lease - runs:start - orders:place - apps:read - apps:write - apps:delete description: A scope to grant. description: A non empty subset of the scope vocabulary. deviceIds: type: array minItems: 1 maxItems: 200 items: type: string description: >- Omit for the whole org. Every id must be a device your org owns. ttlMs: type: integer minimum: 1 maximum: 315360000000 description: Lifetime in milliseconds. At most 3650 days. required: - name - scopes additionalProperties: false responses: '201': description: >- The key was created. This response is the ONLY time the token itself is returned. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/CreatedApiKey' '400': description: >- The body failed validation, or a named device is not one your org owns. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '401': description: No credential, or one that was refused. headers: WWW-Authenticate: description: >- A bearer challenge. On a hosted deployment it names the metadata document to discover the authorization server from, and it adds `error="invalid_token"` when a credential was presented and rejected. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/UnauthorizedError' '403': description: >- Either the credential is an API key rather than a signed-in person, or you asked for a scope your own session does not hold. No recent identity check is asked for: a signed-in person of either role may create a key however long ago they last verified a factor. Branch on `error.code`, never on the status. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' '413': description: >- The request body exceeds the server's limit (1 MiB). Refused before the body is parsed, so nothing was partially applied. Retrying the same body will fail the same way: send less. Per-field limits are tighter than this and are documented on the fields themselves; this is the backstop underneath them. The shape is the same on ordinary JSON surfaces, /vrx included. The explicitly configured APK content stream documents its own byte ceiling. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/PayloadTooLargeError' '429': description: >- Over the request budget for this caller. Hosted deployments only. Which budget applied depends on whether this request carried an `Authorization` header, not on which endpoint it was aimed at. Wait `Retry-After` seconds and retry the same request: the refusal happens before any work, so nothing was partially applied. See /api/rate-limits. headers: Retry-After: description: >- Whole seconds until one request is available again. Computed from the caller's own remaining allowance, not a fixed constant. schema: type: string RateLimit-Limit: description: >- The budget in effect for this caller class, in requests per minute. schema: type: string RateLimit-Remaining: description: >- Whole requests that were still available when this request was admitted. Zero on a 429. schema: type: string RateLimit-Reset: description: >- Seconds until the allowance is back to full. Longer than `Retry-After`, which is the wait for a single request. schema: type: string RateLimit-Policy: description: The budget and its window, as `;w=60`. schema: type: string content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RateLimitedError' '503': description: >- The authentication backend could not be reached. The service fails closed: an infrastructure fault is refused, never waved through. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: CreatedApiKey: allOf: - $ref: '#/components/schemas/ApiKeySummary' - type: object properties: token: type: string description: >- The full bearer token. Shown here ONCE and never stored in recoverable form. required: - token additionalProperties: true description: >- The summary, plus the one and only time the token itself leaves the service. Error: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string enum: - backend_resolution_failed - backend_not_implemented - device_unavailable - device_disconnected - lease_mismatch - lease_required - capability_unsupported - invalid_argument - backend_command_failed - idempotency_conflict - action_outcome_unknown - stale_frame - internal_error - unauthorized - permission_denied - run_not_found - frame_not_found - device_busy - admission_unavailable - checkout_unavailable - checkout_customer_balance - checkout_in_progress - quote_changed - payment_in_progress - out_of_stock - wrong_state - instance_not_served - reverification_required - not_found - receipt_not_found - rate_limited - payload_too_large - origin_not_allowed - api_key_from_browser_origin - key_predates_instance_attribution - org_not_served_by_instance - tenant_binding_unavailable - tenant_binding_unsettled - fleet_at_capacity - forbidden - service_unavailable - invalid_signature - invalid_event - not_settled description: >- The closed set of codes this service answers with on purpose, on MCP tools and REST alike (D152). What each one means and when you get it is on the errors page. message: type: string description: A human readable summary. Do not branch on it, branch on `code`. retryable: type: boolean description: >- Whether re-issuing the same call unchanged is meaningful. It is a property of the occurrence, not of the code, so read the field rather than inferring it. required: - code - message additionalProperties: true description: >- Specific errors add their own fields, such as `deviceId`, `reason` or `capability`. Read the ones you branch on and ignore the rest. required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- The control surface error envelope. Every non 2xx JSON body on this surface has this shape. UnauthorizedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: unauthorized description: Always `unauthorized` on this response. reason: type: string enum: - missing_credentials - malformed_credentials - invalid_token - token_expired - wrong_audience - missing_org - missing_org_role - unknown_key - revoked_key - expired_key description: The closed set of ways authentication can fail. hint: type: string description: >- A next step in prose, on the reasons where there is one to give: `revoked_key`, `expired_key`, `missing_org_role`, and `invalid_token` when the account is not a member of the named organization. Absent otherwise, so branch on `reason` and show this if it is there. required: - code - reason additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A refused credential. `unknown_key` covers both a keyId nobody has and a secret that does not match, because telling those apart would enumerate keys for you. Revocation and expiry are distinguishable, since you owned that key. PayloadTooLargeError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: payload_too_large description: Always `payload_too_large` on this response. message: type: string description: A human readable summary naming the limit in bytes. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Returned when the request body exceeds the server limit. Identical on every surface, including /vrx. RateLimitedError: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string const: rate_limited description: Always `rate_limited` on this response. message: type: string description: >- A human readable summary. The numbers are in the headers, not in here. required: - code - message additionalProperties: false required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- Over the request budget. Raised by the rate limiter before any handler runs, which is why its code is not one of the action codes: nothing was attempted, so no action failed. ApiKeySummary: type: object properties: apiKeyId: type: string description: The key's own id. This is what you pass to revoke it. keyId: type: string description: The public half of the token, the part before the secret. name: type: string scopes: type: array items: type: string enum: - devices:read - devices:act - devices:lease - runs:start - orders:place - apps:read - apps:write - apps:delete description: A granted scope. deviceIds: type: - array - 'null' items: type: string description: >- The device subset this key may see and address, or null for the whole org. createdBy: type: string createdAt: type: string format: date-time expiresAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time revokedAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time lastUsedAt: type: - string - 'null' format: date-time description: >- Updated off the request path, so it can lag slightly behind the last real use. rotatedFrom: type: - string - 'null' description: >- The apiKeyId this key replaced via rotation, or null for keys minted directly. required: - apiKeyId - keyId - name - scopes - deviceIds - createdBy - createdAt - expiresAt - revokedAt - lastUsedAt - rotatedFrom additionalProperties: false description: >- A stored key, as a listing returns it. The secret is not part of it and cannot be recovered. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- The control surface credential. Send `Authorization: Bearer `. Two kinds of token are accepted and they are told apart by shape, not by a separate header. A token beginning `pbk_` is an org scoped API key, whose public half and secret half are generated together and of which only a hash of the secret is ever stored; anything else is treated as an OAuth 2.1 access token and verified against the authorization server's keys. Both resolve to the same context: an org, a principal and a set of scopes. Nothing downstream branches on which channel you used, with one deliberate exception, key management, which requires a signed-in person so that a key can never mint another key. Scopes are enforced when MCP tools are REGISTERED rather than when they are called, so a tool your credential cannot use is absent from `tools/list` rather than refused mid gesture. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.